A major fear was the upcoming future write-off on ABN-AMRO: the price paid included a huge amount for intangibles that could not be placed on the stability sheet. The write-off would only happen if and when ABN-AMRO would cease to be an independent bank (on the mixing of the retail activities of ABN-AMRO into Fortis), however Fortis would then be in danger of not meeting the standards for capital required of banks. Another sore point was the loss on the sale of the enterprise activities; as the sale was compelled (as a result of EU laws) this was not effected at full worth: a €300 million loss was reported on the sale. However, it later turned identified that although Lippens, the chairman of the Supervisory Board of Fortis had claimed to have moved heaven and earth at the EU (only stopping in need of taking the EU to courtroom) to get an extension of the time limit in order to achieve bargaining space (and a greater value) it had not truly utilized for an extension.

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The cabinet was reported to set great store by this letter. Within the letter it turns into clear that the 'sick choose' had started the ball rolling, after reporting sick, by an e-mail to the procureur-generaal, claiming an irregularity. December 18, because of the uncertainty that the take-over would undergo, the share worth of Fortis went up almost 20%, closing at €1.15. That is above the magic €1, below which a share is considered to be a penny stock. December 18, numerous representatives of shareholders, till then litigating separately, united to write a letter to the Belgian Minister of Finance. They made an attraction to all events to sit down down collectively and work out an answer, earlier than year's finish, which would enable Fortis to continue as a Belgian company, and to guarantee as many as potential of its workers of job continuity. Friday December 19, early within the morning, De Standaard draws the conclusion that the Court of Cassation is convinced that the federal government was conscious of the gist of the ruling two days beforehand and had instituted a diversionary manoeuvre (the request by FPIM on Thursday) to derail the ruling: it foresees a hefty debate in parliament.

Essentially, the brand new deal confirms the status quo as it exists since December 12 (the Dutch components being owned by the Dutch authorities, Fortis Bank and the portfolio of toxic credits being owned by the Belgian authorities, with plans to sell 75% of Fortis Bank to BNP Paribas, and with Fortis holding Fortis Insurance International and Fortis Insurance Belgium). What has changed is that 10% of Fortis Insurance Belgium is bought to BNP Paribas and that Fortis goes to buy circa 30% of the portfolio of toxic credits, however at higher situations than agreed on in October (when Fortis was going to purchase 66%, and renegotiations had been forced on October 8). A minor sweetener is that any earnings made on shares of BNP Paribas (beginning from the purchase price at €68) will also be assigned to Fortis (this does not embody any dividends which will likely be kept by the Belgian authorities): this replaces the special plan for the lengthy-time small shareholders (see above). This po st was written wi th the  help　​of GSA Con tent  Gen erator D᠎emoversion !

BNP Paribas, each the sale by Fortis of Fortis Insurance Belgium and the sale by the Belgian authorities of 75% of Fortis Bank. In addition there is a vote on the composition of the Board of Directors, with especially the candidacy of Georges Ugeux noteworthy, being the candidate put forward by the small shareholders to guide the renewed Fortis back into the black. At the February thirteen assembly in Utrecht, the shareholders could vote solely on the composition of the Board of Directors and on an alteration of the Articles of Association. If lower than 50% of the capital is represented on the meeting this final item will not be put to the vote, but another assembly will probably be organized inside four weeks. The Shareholder Circular for the February eleven assembly was printed on January 30: it was dated January 29, but its publication was delayed pending the renegotiations (see above). On the time of publication the Circular had not been adjusted for the result of the renegotiations, but this is predicted to be finished shortly.

On November 1, 2007, an extraordinary shareholder assembly was held to alter ABN AMRO's management. Mark Fisher from RBS took over as CEO. At that assembly the consortium stated that 97% of all shares were in their hands. Fortis would use the ABN AMRO model name for Fortis's retail banking operations within the Netherlands. The take-over value was felt to be on the excessive facet (on February 26, 2009, the Royal Bank of Scotland announced to ebook a loss of over £16 billion on its share in ABN-AMRO). To finance the purchase, Fortis issued further shares out there to the existing shareholders at a low cost, making for the special bargain worth of €15 per share. However, by June 2008, Fortis announced that a global monetary crisis was coming and that it needed to fortify its capital by elevating a further €8.3 billion. An extra one hundred fifty million shares were issued at €10, at that time the price of the share, but in the bigger view of things still a bargain; these had been placed the identical day with large investors.