However, the circuit courtroom did amend the judgment, pursuant to CR 60.01,6 to appropriate the interest charge within the judgment to conform to the amount demanded in the complaint. This appeal by the Keys adopted. Standard OF Review “Although default judgments are usually not favored, a trial court docket is vested with broad discretion when contemplating motions to set them apart, and an appellate courtroom will not overturn the trial court’s choice absent a showing that the trial courtroom abused its discretion.” PNC Bank, N.A. Citizens Bank of Northern Kentucky, Inc., 139 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Ky. App. 2003). Also, an “award of 5 The circuit court docket calculated this date pursuant to CR 73.02, which states that a discover of enchantment shall be filed inside thirty days after service of the judgment. CR 73.02(1)(a). CR 60.01 states: “Clerical errors in judgments, orders or other elements of the file and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the courtroom at any time of its personal initiative or on the motion of any get together .

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CR 55.01 governs default judgments and supplies that when a defendant, like the Keys, fails to plead or otherwise defend an motion, a plaintiff, like Mariner Finance, can apply to the courtroom for a default judgment. The Rule further states: If, in order to allow the court to enter judgment or to carry it into impact, it's necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the reality of any averment by proof or to make an investigation -7- of every other matter, the court docket, with no jury, shall conduct such hearings . CR 55.01. In different phrases, the court might have to conduct a hearing to determine the quantity of damages owed to a plaintiff. Here, the circuit court docket did not conduct any hearing to determine the amount of damages. Instead, the circuit court took Mariner Finance’s averments relating to the damages as true, together with the declare that Mariner Finance’s attorney was owed a one-third contingency charge.

Brown v. Fulton, Hubbard & Hubbard, 817 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Ky. App. 1991) (citing SCR7 3.130(1.5)). On this case, however, the file does not replicate that the circuit courtroom examined any of those components or made any willpower that the attorney’s charge was “reasonable.” Instead, when the Keys defaulted, Mariner Finance tendered a judgment to the circuit courtroom setting forth an award of attorney’s fees based on a one-third contingency price, which Mariner Finance calculated as $2,229.85. Without holding a hearing on the reasonableness of this payment, the circuit court docket signed and entered the tendered judgment. Only when the Keys moved to put aside the default judgment did Mariner Finance present a separate affidavit of its legal professional in response. Even then, nevertheless, the document doesn't reflect that the circuit courtroom reviewed this affidavit or held a hearing to find out the reasonableness of the attorney’s fee. Actually, in addressing this argument, the circuit court docket held: If courts have been required, on motions for default judgments, to peruse monetary agreements, carry out its own calculations as to amounts due, contact counsel for extra information required in making these 7 Kentucky Supreme Court Rules, Rules of Professional Conduct. Th᠎is con᠎tent h as be en generat ed wi​th t​he  help of GSA Conte᠎nt  G ener at᠎or DEMO!

Thus, the circuit court docket ordered the Keys to identify the precise provision(s) of CR 60.02 upon which they based mostly their movement to vacate. Thereafter, the Keys submitted a supplemental transient arguing the default judgment violated CR 54.03. The Keys also asserted that they have been entitled to relief under three subsections of CR 60.02: subsection (a) for “mistake” or “inadvertence”; subsection (e) for “it is now not equitable that the judgment ought to have prospective application”; and subsection (f) for a “reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.” The Keys argued a number of issues fell underneath these three subsections, together with the attorney’s charge challenge. On November 18, 2019, the circuit court denied the Keys’ movement, finding the Keys did not qualify for CR 60.02 relief. The circuit courtroom explained 4 United States Code. 5- that the final day to attraction the May 2, 2019, default judgment was June 1, 2019,5 and, while the Keys’ attorney requested a duplicate of the file on May 28, 2019, that legal professional didn't enter an look or file an attraction by June 1, 2019. Instead, the Keys filed a motion to vacate on September 6, 2019. The circuit courtroom held that, while the Keys might have a meritorious protection, they failed to train affordable diligence to well timed attraction the default judgment by June 1, 2019. Moreover, no “mistake” occurred beneath floor (a) and, likewise, grounds (e) and (f) did not apply to permit the court docket to set aside the judgment.